It is sometimes claimed that we perceive people’s mental states in their expressive features. This paper clarifies the claim by contrasting two possible readings, depending on whether expression is conceived relationally or non-relationally. A crucial difference between both readings is that only a non-relational conception of expression ensures direct access to other minds. The paper offers an argument for a non-relational conception of expression, and therefore for the view that we directly perceive people’s mental states in their expressive features.

This paper defends a Wittgenstein-inspired conception of the nature of mind and self-knowledge. Thus, it is claimed that the mind is to be conceived as expressive behaviour; and that knowledge of one’s own mind is not to be thought of as a matter of first-person access, i.e. a special sort of access available to oneself alone, but rather as a matter of ordinary access, similar to other people’s. It is also argued that this conception does not undermine the distinctness of (...) the first-person perspective, including the asymmetry with the third-person perspective, which should be construed semantically, rather than epistemically. As a result, an alternative to contemporary conceptions of mind and self-knowledge is provided. (shrink)

Volume 33, Issue 8, November 2020, Page 1185-1203.

According to expressivism about avowals, the meaning of typical self-ascriptions of mental states is a matter of expressing an attitude, rather than describing a state of affairs. Traditionally, expressivism has been glossed as the view that, qua expressions, avowals are not truth-evaluable. Contemporary neoexpressivists like Finkelstein and Bar-On have argued that avowals are expressions, and truth-evaluable besides . In contrast, this paper provides a defence of the view that avowals are, qua expressions, truth-evaluable. This defence is based on an argument (...) from disagreement, to the effect that an adequate explanation of the existence of disagreement involving both cases of avowals and cases of nonlinguistic expression (like winces) supports a view according to which genuine (sincere, truthful) expression is what truth amounts to in avowals. (shrink)

This paper claims that we have direct and complete perceptual access to other people’s emotions in their bodily and behavioural expression. The claim is understood, not by analogy with the perception of three-dimensional objects or physical processes, but as a form of Gestalt perception. In addition, talk of direct perceptual access to others’ emotions is shown not to entail a behaviourist view of mind; and talk of complete perceptual access is shown to include both the phenomenological character and the dispositional (...) nature of emotions. (shrink)

There is a recent popular reconstruction of Wittgenstein's thinking about animal minds, according to which animals and humans share a set of expressive abilities, prior to, and independent of, the onset of linguistic-cum-conceptual abilities; a reconstruction that in turn entails a duality of expression and linguistic-cum-conceptual abilities, in adult humans. This paper contends that the reconstruction is implausible and at odds with Wittgenstein's thinking, regarding both the developing minds of children and the minds of non-linguistic animals. Instead, it argues that (...) Wittgenstein's thinking is shaped by an anthropological outlook, according to which linguistic abilities signal the existence of a distinctive human form of life, within which animals do not belong, but into which children are progressively introduced. As a result, there is neither a shared set of expressive abilities in animals, children and adult humans; nor a duality of expression and linguistic-cum-conceptual abilities in humans. (shrink)

José Luis Bermúdez ha defendido una explicación no-circular de la autoconciencia en virtud de contenidos no-conceptuales de primera persona, explicativa y ontogenéticamente básicos. En este artículo se argumenta que los contenidos no-conceptuales explicativamente básicos caen en el mito de lo Dado; mientras que los contenidos no-conceptuales ontogenéticamente básicos, aunque lo evitan, no constituyen la mejor explicación de la adquisición de capacidades cognitivas.

A central feature in contemporary discussions of selfknowledge concerns the epistemic status of mental selfascriptions, such as “I have toothache” or “I believe that p”. The overall project of such discussions is to provide an account of the special status of mental self-ascriptions vis-à-vis other knowledge-claims, including ascriptions of mental states to others. In this respect, two approaches have gained currency in contemporary philosophy. Some authors have focused on the notion of expression, stressing that self-ascriptions are expressions of one’s mental (...) life; whereas others have singled out the notion of transparency as crucial, since self-knowledge involves self-beliefs, and the latter are transparent to one’s available evidence. This critical notice explores one instance of each approach, in order to assess their prospects of success. It concludes that both approaches fail to articulate an account that satisfactorily accommodates the first-person component in the notion of self-knowledge. (shrink)

Pure virtue epistemology faces the fake barn challenge. This paper explains how it can be met. Thus, it is argued that the thought experiment contains a hidden ambiguity concerning the visual ability typically ascribed to, or denied, fake barn subjects. Disambiguation shows fake barn subjects to have limited knowledge of the target proposition. This accords with a pure virtue-theoretic conception of knowledge that predicts and explains all the intuitions elicited by the thought experiment. As a result, the relationship between knowledge, (...) luck and ability is illuminated, and our epistemological theorizing improved. (shrink)

The idea of perspectivity has been explained in terms of the notion of an egocentric map of the world. This egocentric map includes not only perceptual abilities (Evans), but also abilities regarding the active engagement of the subject in the world (Brewer). Now, the explanation of the egocentric-cum-active abilities map cannot be the agent's body, Rather, such an explanation should be sensitive to the agents intentions and the context of active engagement in the world.

Peacocke's explanation of the first-person concept provides non-circu/ar possession conditions for such a concept, accommodating two different constraints: the noncircularity requirement and Evans's Thesis. In this paper, it is argued that Peacocke's explanation faces some difficulties: on the one hand, it appears unable to meet a serious objection facing the non-circularity requirement; on the other hand, it misunderstands the constitutive constraints imposed by Evans's Thesis on a correct account of the first person.

This article takes as its starting-point that a viable account of concept acquisition must be ontogenetically sound, and analyses in detail two alternative accounts of concept acquisition, one conceptualist and the other non-conceptualist, concluding that the conceptualist account is to be preferred.

Deleuze, en el primer capítulo de Nietzsche y la Filosofía,1 introduce los recurrentes tópicos en las obras de Nietzsche: las relaciones entre fuerzas, y la voluntad de poder, con el objetivo de cuestionar la presencia de una dialéctica dentro del pensamiento nietzscheano.Pasajes en la obra de Nietzsche, labradores de una interpretación cuestionable acerca de la confrontación de fuerzas –como el apartado “De la superación de sí mismo” en el Así habló Zaratustra2–, donde se usan las palabras «órdenes», «seres obedientes», «juez» (...) y «vengador», hacen que el estudio de Deleuze se dirija por los caminos de una aceptable duda, como lo haría cualquier estudioso minucioso.Deleuze aborda este tema desde la perspectiva propia de un conocedor de Nietzsche como crítico de Hegel, tal como lo muestra la siguiente frase: «No entenderemos bien el conjunto de la obra de Nietzsche si no vemos “contra quién” van dirigidos los principales conceptos. Los temas hegelianos están presentes en esta obra como el enemigo que se combate». (shrink)

This article explores the connections between the construct of sexism and other sociodemographic and attitudinal variables, such as internalized homonegativity and heteronormative resistances, among psychology students. Both unrefined and inferential analyses were used with a representative sample of 841 psychology students from public universities in Madrid. Results showed higher levels of sexism, internalized homonegativity and low resistances to heteronormativity among groups of men, heterosexuals and conservatives. Interactions were found that showed a higher degree of hostile sexism in: heterosexual people with (...) respect to LGB and heterosexual men with respect to heterosexual women. Also, interactions were found to show a greater degree of heteronormative resistance in: LGB people with respect to heterosexuals and left-wing women with respect to right-wing women. Correlations with sexism varied according to gender identity and sexual orientation. In addition, heteronormative resistances correlated negatively with sexism, while some components of internalized homonegativity correlated positively. Political affiliation was the most frequent predictor of sexism. The results highlight the need for an intersectional approach to understanding the phenomenon of sexism. (shrink)